Introduction
Announcements of open market repurchase programs in the United States have grown dramatically from 131 companies' repurchasing $15.8 billion in 1985 to 1,038 companies' announcing repurchases valued at $147.8 billion in 2001. The importance of stock repurchases as a method of returning capital to shareholders is well established. Previous research has extensively analyzed the volume of repurchase activity, the information content of repurchase announcements and the long-term performance of repurchasing¯rms. (For example see Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) , Stephens and Weisbach (1998) , Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) , and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) ). Little is known, however, about how¯rms implement open market repurchase programs or the impact they have on market liquidity. This lack of knowledge stems from the fact that U.S. repurchase execution data are di±cult to obtain. Current disclosure standards, as regulated by the FASB and the SEC, impose no obligation on¯rms to disclose repurchase details beyond the number of shares outstanding at quarter-end.
1 Quarterly 10Q and annual 10K¯lings provide the only indication of repurchase activity. Consequently, little is known about repurchase trading. This paper provides the¯rst in-depth examination of U.S. repurchase trading behavior. Using voluntarily disclosed data, we examine the timing and market impact of 64 rms' repurchase programs during 1993 and 1994.
Given that a¯rm has decided to initiate a repurchase program, the choice of how and when to trade can be motivated by di®erent goals and have di®erent empirical implications.
The most frequently cited reason for initiating an open market repurchase program is that a¯rm thinks its stock is undervalued and is therefore a good investment. We take the longterm repurchase motivation as given and examine short-term motives for the daily repurchase decision. Essentially, we ask the question: Why does a¯rm repurchase on one day and not on another? The short-term repurchasing motives we consider include cost minimization, price support, liquidity provision, and the strategic use of¯rm-speci¯c information.
For the cost-minimizing repurchaser, the choice of when to repurchase may simply be driven by stock price without concern for alternative impacts such as increased liquidity or price support. As repurchasing¯rms can only buy shares in the open market (and not re-sell them), they face an optimal accumulation problem rather than the more widely-analyzed traditional market timing problem. To evaluate the success of their accumulation strategies, we compare the cost of the realized repurchase portfolio with several naive accumulation strategies. We¯nd mixed results. The larger¯rms in our sample (NYSE-listed) generally perform very well from a cost minimization perspective. On the other hand, smaller¯rms tend to pay relatively high prices for their shares.
Open market repurchase trading can also be used to support a falling stock price by absorbing sell-side pressure. For the corporation motivated by a desire to support its market price, we expect that much of its repurchasing will be done through limit orders which are hit in falling markets. Consistent with successful price support, we¯nd widespread buying at the bid on the NYSE. We document that¯rms repurchase following price drops and that prices stabilize following repurchase trades.
If¯rms are motivated by a desire to provide liquidity (and potentially reduce their cost of capital), it is reasonable to ask whether open market repurchase trading has a detectable impact on alternative measures of liquidity. One way that a¯rm might directly a®ect the quoted spread is by placing a buy limit order. An exposed repurchase limit order can directly raise the bid and thereby reduce the quoted spread. Somewhat less directly, the knowledge that the corporation is buying, perhaps without a formal limit order, can provide su±cient incentive for market makers to increase the bid or provide more quoted depth at the current bid. 2 In either case, we should detect increases in sell-side liquidity.
There is a sizeable literature on the liquidity e®ects of open market repurchase program announcements. Barclay and Smith (1988) , Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti (1994) , and Miller and McConnell (1995) each examine changes in the bid-ask spread surrounding open market repurchase announcements and¯nd mixed results. These studies focus on liquidity as the explicit cost of transacting, measured by the quoted bid-ask spread. We extend this literature by analyzing days of actual repurchase trading as opposed to announcement ef-fects. We compare days when repurchase trades are executed to surrounding non-repurchase days. Consistent with repurchase trading contributing to market liquidity, we document that quoted spreads are narrower on repurchase days than on the days immediately preceding and following a repurchase. Additionally, for Nasdaq stocks, spreads narrow dramatically by over 11 cents per share compared to a pre-repurchase announcement trading period.
Liquidity is also related to the price impact of executing a trade. For example, Kyle (1985) de¯nes liquidity as the order°ow needed to move prices one unit, and O'Hara (1995) de¯nes a liquid market as one which accommodates trading with the least e®ect on price.
We examine whether liquidity, as measured by the order°ow price change relationship, is di®erent when corporations are actively repurchasing stock. Consistent with repurchaserelated increased liquidity, we¯nd a lower price impact for order imbalances on repurchase days than on non-repurchase days. Repurchase trading appears to absorb sell-side order imbalances. Thus from two liquidity perspectives, changes in quoted spreads and the price impact of trades, we document evidence that repurchase trading does not detract from market liquidity and appears to be a net contributor.
The¯nal, and perhaps most controversial, repurchase motivation we consider is whether the repurchasing¯rm is motivated by the opportunity to pro¯t from proprietary¯rm-speci¯c information. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) examine the monthly repurchase timing for a set of Canadian¯rms and¯nd that repurchase activity is linked to price movements. We take their analysis one step further and examine the daily repurchase decision as it relates to past and future price and market movements. We¯nd evidence that¯rms repurchase following days when prices have fallen, but¯nd no clear evidence that they are able to trade in advance of price increases. Additionally, we¯nd that¯rms signi¯cantly curtail repurchasing in the¯ve day window centered on¯rm speci¯c announcements. Thus, trading on proprietary information is not evident in our sample.
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Of course, none of the motivations we consider for stock repurchasing are mutually exclusive. The¯rm's actual motivation could be a combination of any or all of the motivations we consider. Additionally, empirically it is di±cult to distinguish among the di®erent motivations. For example, price support and liquidity provision motivations can both be 3 Given that our dataset has been voluntarily disclosed, this result is not surprising.
accomplished by buying at the bid. Consequently, we cannot easily tell whether liquidity provision is a direct objective for the repurchasing program or an indirect bene¯t of a price support strategy.
The study most closely related to ours is Brockman and Chung (2001 They¯nd that repurchases have a detrimental e®ect on liquidity. They¯nd wider bid-ask spreads and narrower depths during repurchase trading, evidence consistent with a negative response to the presence of informed managerial trading. We¯nd that U.S. repurchase trading appears to contribute to market liquidity. We document narrower bid-ask spreads and less price movement during periods of order imbalance on U.S. repurchase trading days.
Thus, the disclosure environment appears to play an important role in the behavior and impact of repurchase trading.
The main results we present are:
² Repurchase programs vary widely across¯rms. That is, program length, speed of completion, and timing vary widely in our sample. For example, one¯rm completed its announced program on one trading day, while another repurchased on 288 of 387 trading days following the program's announcement.
² We¯nd evidence that¯rms decrease repurchasing activity around¯rm-speci¯c information announcements. Thus they appear to take care to avoid trading on short-term information.
² We¯nd that many¯rms repurchase following price drops. On the NYSE, daily re-purchase volume is related to contemporaneous and lagged price changes and trading volumes. Nasdaq¯rms' repurchase volumes are unrelated to both lagged excess return measures and contemporaneous price changes.
² Trade execution appears to be in°uenced by market structure (speci¯cally, the use of limit orders) and¯rm size. On the NYSE, 38.9% of repurchase trades are executed at the prevailing market bid, consistent with the use of a limit order. On the Nasdaq, only 8.1% of trades are similarly executed.
² We show that repurchase trading contributes to market liquidity through narrower bid-ask spreads on repurchase days than on adjacent non-repurchase days, and that order imbalances move prices less when repurchasing¯rms are active in the market.
² From a cost perspective, we¯nd that NYSE¯rms pay signi¯cantly less compared to several naive accumulation strategies. In contrast, Nasdaq¯rms pay more compared to these same strategies.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the solicitation and construction of our repurchase dataset. Section 3 provides a detailed description of several programs in our sample. Section 4 documents daily and intradaily repurchase patterns. Section 5 provides an analysis of the daily decision to repurchase shares. Section 6 examines the liquidity aspects of repurchase programs. Section 7 discusses the methods and benchmarks we use to measure timing ability within the repurchase period. Section 8 o®ers concluding remarks. 10, 1993 and March 4, 1994 . Appendix A provides a copy of the questionnaire we sent to the 478¯rms. Sixty-eight¯rms responded to our request. Four of the 68 indicated that they were unable, or unwilling, to provide the requested data. The remaining 64¯rms constitute the sample used in our study. 4 One¯rm changed its listing from the Nasdaq to the NYSE during its repurchase program and, consequently, our¯nal sample includes 24 NYSE programs and 41 Nasdaq programs.
The Repurchase Data Set
Firms provided the target dollar amount of the program or the target number of shares, the program status (complete or on-going), the agent designated to coordinate the repurchase activity, and the name of a contact person. The disclosed trading data include the trading dates, the exchange used, the number of shares acquired, the price paid per share, and an indication of whether the prices were exact or a daily average. We undertook several checks to ensure the accuracy of the response data. Initially, we checked the reported volume against total daily volumes from the NYSE Transactions and Quotations (TAQ) dataset.
We contacted the corporations for clari¯cation when we encountered infeasible trades. 5 Our nal dataset includes 84.2 million shares traded on 2,190¯rm-trade days for 64¯rms in 1993
and 1994.
In order to examine trade execution location and within-day repurchase timing, transactionlevel repurchase data are necessary. Most¯rms in our sample provided total shares repurchased and an average price for each trading day. Some¯rms provided more detail such as daily volume repurchased at each trading price. We use combinatorial programming across the entire sample to identify repurchase transactions from the NYSE Transactions and Quotations (TAQ) database. We provide details of the combinatorial procedure in Appendix B. Of the 3,585 reported repurchases across 64¯rms and 2,190¯rm days, we locate 2,655 repurchase trades on 1,431¯rm days representing over 31 million shares. This is the sample used in our analysis of within-day timing.
Overall, our sample represents a wide cross-section of the market. The 1993 average daily trading volume ranges from 32,500 shares to over 95 million shares, with an average of 12.6 million shares. The market capitalization ranges from $6 million to over $31 billion.
The percent of the total daily volume acquired in one day ranges from .03% to 100%. 6 The 4 Many of the participating corporations provided their repurchase data with the understanding that their participation in the study be con¯dential.
5 The most common inconsistencies were due to reporting settlement rather than execution dates, and including brokerage commissions in the price. We exclude eight transactions from six¯rms which were not feasible and no resolution was found, forty-two reported repurchase days in 1992 (due to the absence of TAQ data), and eight trades reported as private transactions.
6 SEC regulation 10b-18 restricts non-block repurchase volume to 25% of the average daily trading volume percent of outstanding shares targeted ranges from .56% to 32.8%, with an average of 7%.
The trading frequency varies widely across¯rms. One¯rm repurchased their announced program target on one day (a very small program), whereas another¯rm repurchased on 288 of 387 consecutive trading days. Firms waited an average of 17 days following the announcement of a repurchase to make their¯rst trade. One¯rm waited 124 days, over four months, from the announcement of the repurchase program to begin repurchasing.
If¯rms are repurchasing with a liquidity provision or price support motive, the structure of equity trading can a®ect whether a program can meet its objective. Speci¯cally, how and when¯rms repurchase may depend upon the exchange where a¯rm's stock is listed; a specialist system such as the NYSE may a®ord di®erent opportunities for the¯rm than the dealer structure used on the Nasdaq. On the NYSE, limit orders compete with the specialist and can directly in°uence the quoted bid-ask spread and provide an e®ective vehicle for providing price support. During the time of our study, however, Nasdaq market makers were under no obligation to display limit orders they received. As such, the Nasdaq operated as a pure dealer market, with the public unable to compete directly with market makers to directly e®ect a narrowing of the quoted spread. The absence of a Nasdaq guarantee that a limit order will be displayed limits their usefulness as a mechanism for liquidity provision and price support.
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When we consider how much of a day's volume a¯rm repurchases, trading protocol may also in°uence repurchase costs. For example, due to dealer-to-dealer trading on the Nasdaq, reported trading volume is overstated relative to NYSE volume. Accordingly, the percent of daily trading volume repurchased is understated (relative to NYSE). To allow for potential microstructure e®ects, we segregate our sample by exchange listing.
8 Table 1 provides summary statistics partitioned by exchange listing. As might be expected: (i) NYSE-listed¯rms are signi¯cantly larger than the Nasdaq¯rms; (ii) NYSE¯rms during the 4 calendar weeks prior to the week of a repurchase. Additionally, it is a safe harbor, not a requirement. Thus, there is no prohibition on taking 100% of a day's total trading volume. 7 Repurchases can a®ect market liquidity through increased trading depth even without the requirement that repurchase limit orders be displayed. Repurchase trading represents a signi¯cant portion of daily volume in our sample (especially on the Nasdaq). This assurance of greater trading depth may prompt market makers to change their quotes, an indirect e®ect, rather than a direct e®ect from displaying the limit order. Thus, even unexposed limit orders may be useful to the repurchasing Nasdaq¯rms.
8 A few¯rms in our sample indicated in their responses that trading structure is a relevant consideration when repurchasing.
repurchase on more days; and (iii) NYSE¯rms repurchase more shares in total. However, there is no di®erence in the relative size of the programs as measured by the target percent of outstanding shares sought for repurchasing. Interestingly, the Nasdaq¯rms take a signi¯cantly larger share of the day's trading volume on days they do repurchase.
Potential Survey Nonresponse Bias
Gathering data through survey introduces a potential self-selection bias in¯rms that choose to respond. There are at least two reasons why a¯rm might not wish to have its repurchase record revealed. First, if a¯rm is successful in using information to its advantage while repurchasing, accusations of manipulation or fraud may arise. For this reason, it may be di±cult to detect repurchase-related excess trading pro¯ts in the records of our respondinḡ rms. On the other hand, if a¯rm loses money on its repurchase program, paying too much for its shares or consistently buying at the worst possible times, it may likewise choose not to respond to our survey. Consequently, our dataset most likely contains¯rms that do not perform too well or too poorly, and our¯ndings are likely attenuated relative to non-responding¯rms.
We investigate the potential nonresponse bias using two types of data. First we examine¯rm-level characteristics of responding and non-responding¯rms. Second, to address potential performance-related reasons for a¯rm's not wishing to have its repurchase record revealed, we examine market-based return data. Table 2 provides details.
The responding¯rms have a signi¯cantly larger mean market value of equity compared to non-respondents ($2,646 versus $781 million). However, the data are highly skewed. Nonparametric tests reveal no apparent di®erence in median¯rm size. Program size, expressed as a percentage of outstanding shares is similar (6.9%) for responding and non-respondinḡ rms. The response count for Nasdaq¯rms (41¯rms or 17.5% of those solicited) is higher than that for NYSE¯rms (24¯rms or 12.1% of those solicited). The higher percentage of responding Nasdaq¯rms helps to explain the lower annual trading volume we report for our sample of responding¯rms relative to the non-responding¯rms.
We examine cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the program announcements and for three years following the program announcement for the full set of¯rms announcing open market repurchase programs during 1993 and 1994. Cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement are measured for two days (0, +1) using a market model. Market model parameters are estimated over the period -100 to -11. Three-year abnormal returns are measured two ways. First, we calculate market-adjusted holding period returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index. Second, following Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) , we calculate holding period size-adjusted returns relative to NYSE size portfolio deciles. Consistent with Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) , we¯nd positive abnormal returns at the announcement and for the three years after announcement. Importantly, we¯nd no di®erence in returns between the responding and the non-responding¯rms. Overall, while our sample is small, on these limited dimensions it appears representative of open market repurchase programs in general during the period we study.
The use of survey data can always be subject to criticism, even when the survey data are veri¯able (as with repurchase trades). However, we feel that it is important to weigh the potential gain in our understanding of issues not currently addressable with publicly available datasets against any possible over-generalizations fostered by potential self-selection bias.
Without an SEC-or FASB-directed change in repurchase disclosure requirements, survey is the only technique available for examining the timing and implementation of U.S. repurchase programs. Ultimately, the possibility of self-selection bias remains and all results should be interpreted with this in mind.
Characterizing Repurchase Trading
The level of detail in our repurchase sample permits an examination of questions not previously addressed. Do¯rms repurchase an equal number of shares on a daily basis throughout a program? Do they repurchase in proportion to market volume? Is the choice of repurchase day related to price movement or general market activity? Do¯rms time their trades with respect to either information releases or inside information? The¯rms in our sample exhibit great diversity in trading execution. Therefore, prior to treating our sample as observations from a homogeneous population, we provide a detailed characterization of four di®erent programs that highlight the heterogeneity in our sample. Figure 1 displays the daily repurchase volume of the four¯rms across time.
² Firm 1 announced an intent to repurchase 2,100,000 shares in the open market. It waited two days and then repurchased 225,000 shares over the following 6 days, after which it did not successfully repurchase for the next 59 trading days. 9 The¯rm then repurchased 1,000,000 shares over 13 of the next 16 trading days. It did not repurchase for the following 25 trading days and achieved its stated target by buying 875,000 shares over the subsequent 9 trading days. Over the duration of the program, the¯rm repurchased between 5,000 and 191,700 shares per day.
² Firm 2 announced an intent to repurchase up to $500 million of its common stock in the open market. It waited 10 trade days to enter the market and then executed repurchases on 45 of the following 47 trade days, averaging 210,980 shares per day, and ranging from 50,000 to 1,258,000 shares per day. Two days after this buying period, the¯rm released an earnings announcement stating \better than expected¯rst quarter results." On the¯fth day following this announcement, the¯rm resumed repurchasing. It completed its stated target in the next 11 trading days, with average repurchase of 208,590 shares per day.
² Firm 3 announced an intent to purchase common stock with aggregate market value of up to $50 million. The¯rm waited¯ve weeks to enter the market. After repurchasing 513,800 shares over 25 weeks, the¯rm announced a continuation of the repurchase program (for an additional $50 million). Over the entire 65 week period of our analysis, the¯rm purchased a total of 3.6 million shares valued at $100,000,000 including commissions on 288 of 325 trade days. Daily shares repurchased ranged from 100 to 50,000 with a mode of 6,000 shares per day. The¯rm's repurchase behavior does not appear to change for information releases. It also appears unrelated to changes in non-repurchase trading volume.
² Firm 4 announced an intent to repurchase up to $25 million of common stock. It waited two days to begin repurchasing. The¯rm bought 300,000 shares on nine of the following 18 trade days. After 24 weeks without a repurchase, it bought 930,000 shares over 18 of 45 trading days. There appears to be some relationship between the¯rm's repurchasing behavior and stock prices during the repurchase period. For example, prior to the announced repurchase, the stock fell from a high of $15.625 to $8.75. Thē rm bought shares in the range of $8.75 to $9 per share and stopped buying as the stock price began rising. During the 24 week window when the¯rm did not trade, the stock traded in the $12 range. When the price fell to $9 per share the¯rm re-entered the market for more repurchases. Following the last reported repurchase, the stock was trading in the $13 range.
The diversity of these examples suggests that general statements about repurchase program execution can be misleading. By design, any statistical analysis will deemphasize the diversity of styles and objectives of repurchasing¯rms.
Frequency & Timing of Repurchase Trading
The¯rst question we address is \When do¯rms repurchase and do they represent a signi¯-cant presence in the market?" Table 3 On the Nasdaq, repurchase trading accounts for 33% of a repurchase day's reported trading volume. Nasdaq¯rms, however, only repurchased on an average of 16 out of 116 reported days. The total reported repurchase volume of 14.6 million shares represents 10.4% of aggregate trading volume reported over the entire repurchase program. That is, about 1 in every 10 shares traded during the repurchase period is a repurchase. Overall, trading on a NYSE repurchase day is more likely (than trading on a Nasdaq repurchase day), although within such a day meeting an NYSE¯rm as a counterparty is less likely (than meeting a Nasdaq rm as a counterparty).
We also examine trading by the day of the week. Gibbons and Hess (1981) volume patterns on the Nasdaq, the Nasdaq¯rms in our sample do not appear to exhibit such a pattern. Non-repurchase volume (which includes unidenti¯ed repurchases) is roughly constant over the course of the day and increases slightly at the close. Repurchase activity exhibits a dramatic increase between 3:00 and 3:30, nearly tripling relative to the rest of the trade day, before dropping to only 2% during the¯nal half-hour of trading.
While these initial patterns suggest some regularities in repurchase timing, in order to focus on repurchase motivations, we examine in more detail when¯rms buy. In particular, our dataset allows us to examine whether¯rms follow the market and hide amongst liquidity traders, whether they provide additional liquidity by buying when others are not, or whether they step in during falling markets to support the market price. As liquidity provision and price support are not typically listed among¯rms' reasons for establishing a repurchase program, we¯rst consider more generally the possible stimuli that prompt a¯rm to trade.
The Repurchase Decision
The choice of how many shares to repurchase on a given day and when to repurchase them can be driven by many factors. As can be seen in Figure 1 ,¯rms do not trade uniformly through time. In this section, we take a two-step approach. First we focus on factors that may encourage a¯rm to transact at various levels on a given day. We estimate a model of daily repurchase volume that considers recent and future market conditions (assuming insider foresight), contemporaneous non-repurchase trading, the level of program completion and¯rm announcement timing. Second, to examine more directly the evidence that would be consistent with price support or liquidity provision, we examine repurchase timing within the trade day.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) document that¯rms increase repurchasing in months following price drops for a set of Canadian¯rms. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) examine quarterly repurchase volume in the United States and¯nd that it is negatively related to prior returns and is positively related to both expected and unexpected cash°ows.
Our investigation examines the daily decision to repurchase as it relates to past and future price drops and overall market movements. If a¯rm is interested in a cost minimization strategy, recent stock price movements could contribute to the choice of trade day. For example, when there is evidence of mean reversion in price, a naive cost minimization strategy would involve buying more shares following price declines. In contrast, if a¯rm is using inside information to time their trades, we would expect increased buying following price drops and preceding price increases. We would also expect trading levels to vary systematically around the release of¯rm speci¯c information. When liquidity provision or price support are contributing motivations, in addition to increased repurchasing during or soon after price decreases, we would expect repurchasing to be correlated with market conditions such as nonrepurchase trading volume and order imbalances. Speci¯cally, we would expect increased repurchase activity during periods of low trading volume or sell pressure. 12 By way of 12 As we only see ex post trading volume, inclusive of the repurchase activity, it is not possible to isolate contrast, if a repurchasing¯rm is interested in hiding amongst existing liquidity rather than increasing it, the¯rm may be more aggressive in repurchasing when non-repurchase trading volume is higher.
In an attempt to determine whether¯rms are strategically repurchasing, we estimate a tobit model of the daily repurchase decision. We focus on the raw number of shares repurchased on each day because this is the decision variable for a person implementing a repurchase program. Additionally, examination of the plots in Figure 1 reveals that somē rms buy a¯xed number of shares on a daily basis and deviate from this level sporadically.
The independent variables we consider as potential motivating factors for a¯rm to execute a repurchase include contemporaneous, lead and lagged market and¯rm-speci¯c variables.
Speci¯cally, we include the contemporaneous market return proxied by the daily return on the S&P 500 (R M t ), the excess stock return (XR i;t ) de¯ned as the stock return less the contemporaneous return on the S&P500, lead and lag cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 13 non-repurchase trading volume (V N R i;t ), the percent of the program completed to date (C i;t ), an indicator variable set to one if the¯rm made any news announcement on the day (A i;t ), or in the two days leading up to or following the announcement (A i;t § 2 ).
We estimate the following Tobit model of the daily repurchase intensity:
We estimate the model separately for each¯rm using the complete time series of trade days starting 10 trade days prior to the¯rst reported repurchase through 10 trade days following the last reported repurchase. We report the mean and median estimated coe±cients across estimations and the p-values related to a t-test and signed rank test against the null hypothesis that the mean (median) coe±cient is equal to zero.
14 We report the results for order imbalances in this framework. We examine this issue in another context when we consider liquidity impacts of repurchasing. 13 We measure cumulative abnormal returns as the buy and hold excess return of the stock relative to the S&P 500 over 3-day, 5-day and 10-day windows, in advance of and following days of successful repurchases. While we only present the 3-day estimations, the results are qualitatively the same for the 5-day and 10-day CAR analyses.
14 We have also estimated a¯rm¯xed e®ect Tobit model. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported and are available from the authors upon request.
the full sample of¯rms and partitioned by exchange listing. Table 4 contains the results.
For the full sample of¯rms, we¯nd that¯rms increase repurchasing during periods of high non-repurchase trading volume. Importantly, all¯rms in our sample curtail repurchasing in the¯ve-day window centered around¯rm-speci¯c information releases. Thus, they take care to avoid trading on inside information which is being publicly disseminated.
Interestingly, as the repurchase program moves along through time, the size of daily repurchases increases. This may be driven in part by the SEC safe harbor rules for repurchasing shares.
15 The results regarding the return-related variables di®er by exchange listing. For the 23 NYSE¯rms in our sample, we¯nd that they repurchase more when the market is contemporaneously down, the excess return of the stock is lower, and when the cumulative abnormal return for the prior 3 days is more negative. Thus, these¯rms appear to be price sensitive in the daily repurchase decision. For the 40 Nasdaq¯rms, we¯nd no signi¯cant relationship between price movements and the number of shares repurchased. The Nasdaq rms are sensitive to the amount of non-repurchase trading volume. Thus it appears that they attempt to hide amongst or consume exiting liquidity.
16 Neither subsample appears to repurchase consistently in advance of price increases. 17 Overall, we conclude from the Tobit analysis that NYSE¯rms are price sensitive repurchasers at least at the choice of day level, and Nasdaq repurchasers are not. We next turn to the decision of when within a day to buy shares.
15 SEC Rule 10b-18 provides a safe harbor for repurchasing if repurchased shares remain below 25% of the average daily trading volume in the 4 calendar weeks prior to the week of the repurchase. Thus, the allowable shares to repurchase is path dependent.
16 Alternatively, due to the nature of the dealer market on Nasdaq, it may be that the repurchase transaction results in a matching dealer-to-dealer transaction. In this case, there would be no intention of the¯rm to repurchase when volume is higher { non-repurchase volume is higher due to the repurchase itself.
17 Under a short-term timing hypothesis, it is the expectation of future returns that might determine repurchase intensity. We use realized returns in the estimations. Assuming the¯rms have unbiased but not perfectly accurate forecasts of their future returns, these coe±cients are going to be biased toward zero due to measurement error. This may be one reason why the coe±cients are insigni¯cant. We thank the referee for pointing out this alternative hypothesis. Barclay and Smith (1988) hypothesize that, by placing limit orders at which it is willing to buy shares, a¯rm could establish a lower bound on the bid price, and thus help to support a falling stock price. They termed this use of limit orders to buy at the bid thè Competing Market-Maker Hypothesis.' Our regression results indicate that NYSE¯rms buy on down market days, consistent with both repurchasing as cheaply as possible and posting a stabilizing bid to help support a falling stock price. We examine the timing of trades and trade execution location relative to the bid-ask spread to determine whether corporations are using limit or working orders at the bid in an attempt to establish a°oor price.
Within-Day Repurchase Analysis
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As can be seen in Table 5 If¯rms are repurchasing with a price support motivation (and they are successful), we should see prices falling within-day in advance of a repurchase trade and stabilizing or rising after the repurchase. To investigate this possibility, we examine intraday returns surrounding repurchase trading. We partition each trade day return into two parts; return from the open to the repurchase, and return from the repurchase to the close, to determine if¯rms are buying in advance of the price drop or following the price drop. We calculate intraday returns using the midpoint of the current bid-ask spread to eliminate the e®ect of bid-ask bounce in our analysis.
Results are contained in Panel B of Table 5 . Consistent with our regression results, wē nd that NYSE¯rms are buying on`down-trending' days. The price of NYSE stocks falls by .66% (p-value = :0001) from the open to the close on repurchase days. On the NYSE, prices fall by -.61% (p-value = :0001) from the open to the repurchase and only drop by an 18 We assign quotes to trades using a 5-second lag as suggested by Lee and Ready (1991) .
additional -.05% (p-value = :0568) from the repurchase to the close. Thus, on repurchase days, over 90% of the price movement occurs prior to repurchase trades. We¯nd a falling price immediately prior to repurchase, purchasing at a low price (the bid price), and a relatively stable price following the repurchase. Thus, NYSE repurchases seem to absorb downward price pressure and act as a stabilizing mechanism. By contrast, on the Nasdaq, the stock price is°at on repurchase days. Our Nasdaq¯rms appear to exhibit no impact on prices when they repurchase.
Other Evidence of Liquidity Impact
While we have presented some evidence of repurchase execution behavior that could result in a more liquid market for a repurchasing company's stock, the execution behavior should also a®ect traditional measures of liquidity like spread and price impact. By way of review, the existing literature has argued that there are two ways a¯rm's repurchase program can a®ect the liquidity of a stock. Consistent with our evidence that repurchase trading can supplement liquidity on the bid side, Barclay and Smith (1988) suggest that regular repurchases can provide competition for market makers and potentially make a¯rm's shares more liquid. By posting limit orders to buy, the¯rm can establish a lower bound price for a stock and in doing so, e®ect a narrowing of the bid-ask spread during execution. In this case, increased liquidity is related to a narrowing of the bid-ask spread. Alternatively, Barclay and Smith (1988) 19 Even if there is a wider spread during
19 Others investigating the potential spread widening in the United States have not always concurred that there is a repurchase-related widening in the spread. See e.g., Miller and McConnell (1995) and Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti (1994) . Brockman and Chung (2001) investigate the liquidity impact of repurchasing in Hong Kong. They document spread widening on repurchase days, consistent with an asymmetric information e®ect. Importantly, repurchase trading is disclosed by the start of trading on the following business day in Hong Kong. Thus, when a repurchase program is initiated (as opposed to announced), market participants the repurchase period overall, our dataset allows us to examine execution-related temporary narrowing within this wider spread to see if¯rms are competing with other buyers to provide liquidity to sellers.
A second means of a®ecting market liquidity is to absorb sell-side pressure by standing ready to buy shares at the bid without allowing the price to fall. To examine this aspect of liquidity, we consider the change in a¯rm's stock price in the presence of sell-side pressure.
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The higher the change in price resulting from a trade, the lower the liquidity. Using a methodology developed by Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (1999) , we examine whether the price impact of trades di®ers on repurchase days from that on non-repurchase days. That is, we examine if repurchasing¯rms, by absorbing sell-side order imbalances, limit the negative price impact generally associated with large order imbalances.
Bid-Ask Spread E®ects
Isolating repurchase impact on spreads is challenging because we do not know: (i) how and when managers communicate or signal their intent or willingness to buy to a broker; and,
(ii) how brokers use, or communicate to others, corporate intent. Communication may not constitute an explicit order. For instance, the repurchasing¯rm may call a broker and seek current quotes while indicating that it may be in the market for 50,000 shares. While not an order, the communication can in°uence quotes.
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To address liquidity provision within the repurchase period, we make paired comparisons of spreads on repurchase days to spreads on adjacent non-repurchase days and to spreads are informed of the corporate presence.
20 Since¯rms can only buy shares, they can only confer this type of liquidity bene¯t during periods of sell-side order imbalance.
21 It is important to consider the impact of alternative market structures in this type of analysis. The limit order book on the NYSE provides a direct venue for¯rms to in°uence the spread proactively. The absence of a publicly displayed limit order book on the Nasdaq (during the time of this study) made it di±cult for corporations to have the same direct in°uence on quoted spreads. Market makers were under no obligation to either publicly display limit orders or update their posted quotes to re°ect limit orders that bettered their quotes. However, repurchase trading does a®ect market depth. On average, repurchase trading provides one third of a repurchase day's trading volume on Nasdaq. This assurance of greater trading depth (or verbal indications of interest) may prompt market makers to change their quotes, an indirect e®ect rather than the direct e®ect of displaying the limit order. during a time period uncontaminated by repurchase trading. 22 We use a transactions-based spread calculation methodology to re°ect transaction-relevant spreads. The statistics are computed using the spreads attached to actual transactions. This procedure ignores regional autoquotes, and other types of non-competitive and stale quotes. We de¯ne the ask (bid)
prevailing at the time of the n th transaction on¯rm i's stock on day t as a 24 Abnormal spreads are de¯ned as the repurchase day spread less the spread on the benchmark day. In the statistics we present, the spread measures are constructed by¯rst calculating an average spread for each¯rm, and then averaging the averages across¯rms (rather than simply averaging abnormal spreads across all¯rm trade days which gives undue in°uence to¯rms with many days of repurchases). Table 6 contains daily abnormal spread measures. The average daily spread for the¯rms in our sample is 37 cents. Relative to the pre-repurchase period, this represents a narrowing of nearly eight cents. For the Nasdaq¯rms in our sample, the average daily spread narrows by 11.1 cents relative to the pre-repurchase period. To the contrary, on the NYSE, the spread remains unchanged relative to the pre-repurchase period.
The abnormal spreads relative to lag and lead benchmarks are signi¯cantly negative and average about 1 cent. 25 The results hold for both the NYSE and the NASDAQ sub-samples.
Overall, our results support the notion that open market repurchase executions can, through
22 We choose the 4 calendar weeks prior to the week of the announcement of the repurchase program as an uncontaminated trading period. We calculated an average spread for each the 50¯rms with identi¯able announcements where there was no evidence of an on-going repurchase program and label this the \pre-repurchase" benchmark. 23 The prevailing bid and ask refer to the best bid and o®er (BBO) which we calculate for NYSE stocks using quotes from all regional exchanges. TAQ reports only the BBO for NASDAQ stocks, not the individual quotes from which the BBO is calculated.
24 A lead (lag) benchmark refers to the day before (after) a repurchase day when the corporation did not repurchase. Thus, if a¯rm repurchases on three consecutive days, the¯rst day will have a lead benchmark and the third day will have a lag benchmark. The second day will have neither a lead nor lag benchmark.
25 See Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1996) for a microstructure discussion of the economic signi¯cance of changes in quoted bid-ask spreads. They demonstrate the economic and statistical signi¯cance of small dollar spread changes, e.g. 1 cent.
the narrowing of spreads, provide a liquidity bene¯t to the market. Additionally, we¯nd no evidence to support an asymmetric information repurchase-related spread widening as found by Brockman and Chung (2001) . Consistent with our goal of characterizing repurchase execution strategies, our emphasis is primarily the documentation of statistically signi¯cant patterns in repurchase behavior and market impact. Nonetheless, we also believe that many of our results provide evidence of the economically signi¯cant impact repurchase programs can have on NYSE and Nasdaq trading. For a change in spread of 11 cents relative to the pre-repurchase period for Nasdaq rms, there is little doubt that the economic stakes are signi¯cant. We would argue that even a one-cent change in spread for the repurchase day represents a potentially signi¯cant economic impact for the large volume of other traders active on a repurchase day.
Price Impact Liquidity E®ects
The second measure of liquidity we consider is the change in a¯rm's stock price associated with its observed trading volume. The higher the change in price resulting from a trade, the lower the liquidity. Adopting the Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (1999), (hereafter BHK) \net turnover" approach, we examine the price impact of trades on repurchase days relative to non-repurchase days. We partition each trading day into thirteen 30-minute trading windows and calculate a return using the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread during each window. Net turnover (NTO) is de¯ned as buyer-initiated volume less seller-initiated volume as a fraction of shares outstanding.
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We estimate three regressions for each¯rm, using the half-hourly observations of return and NTO to estimate the relationship between 30-minute net turnovers and 30-minute returns for repurchase and non-repurchase days. We include an indicator variable (R) set to 1 if the¯rm made a repurchase on a day and interact the indicator with the NTO variable. We report results across all market conditions and also partition the results based on whether NTO is positive (buy-pressure) or negative (sell-pressure) to isolate the impact of repurchasing behavior under each scenario. We report the mean coe±cient across the¯rm speci¯c estimations in Panel A of Table 7 . The estimation equation takes the form: Return = ® 1 +¯1 NTO +¯2(R ¢ NTO) + ² As BHK have documented, the typical relationship between return and the signed variable NTO is positive. That is, larger positive NTO is correlated with larger positive return.
Larger negative NTO is correlated with larger negative return. Our¯rms exhibit this same general relationship. However, our interest is the in°uence of repurchasing programs on this relationship. In our estimations, the coe±cient¯2 should capture any repurchase-related impacts on the NTO-return relationship.
There are two ways in which a repurchasing¯rm's buying behavior can a®ect the usual relationship between NTO and price changes. The¯rst and easiest to understand is when a repurchasing¯rm leans against selling pressure to absorb some of it by buying from those wishing to sell (provides price support). Conditional on overall selling pressure (N T O < 0), the repurchaser's demand for shares can increase the price from what it would otherwise have to be to satisfy the selling pressure (relative to when the repurchaser is not in the market).
If repurchasers are absorbing selling pressure, we expect a negative NTO to be greeted by a higher than`usual' price. This implies a smaller than usual price change (down). This attenuation of price decrease (or relative price increase) implies a regression coe±cient on R ¤ N T O that is negative (so that the product of the coe±cient and R ¤ N T O is positive).
The results in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that for the subset of data where there is selling pressure (N T O < 0), the coe±cient on R ¤ N T O has the predicted negative sign and is statistically signi¯cant for both NYSE and Nasdaq¯rms.
The second way a repurchasing¯rm's buyer behavior can in°uence the relationship between NTO and price change is when the repurchasing¯rm is a component of buying pressure during periods of overall buying pressure (N T O > 0). Here we have a similar attenuating e®ect when the repurchaser is more patient than other contributors to buy-side pressure.
For a given level of N T O > 0, if the repurchase demand on the ask side is more patient than other purchasers, the price increase necessary to satisfy demand-side pressure should be lower. When patient repurchasing demand is present, we expect the positive NTO to be greeted by a lower than usual price (and correspondingly a lower than usual price increase). This attenuation of price increase has a regression re°ection involving a coe±cient on R ¤ N T O (now a positive variable) that is negative (so that the product is negative).
Panel A of Table 7 indicates that for the buying pressure subset (N T O > 0), the coe±cient on R ¤ N T O has the predicted negative sign and is statistically signi¯cant for both NYSE and Nasdaq¯rms.
In Panel B of Table 7 , we introduce a¯rm¯xed-e®ect regression, pooling all¯rms and days together. This allows us to consider all cases of NTO (positive, negative and zero) simultaneously. We use multiple dummy variables to condition on market pressure (negative (N eg = 1) or positive (P os = 1) NTO) and the presence of a repurchaser (R = 1).
With the inclusion of market-neutral data (N T O = 0), the dummy variables allow us to calibrate changes from neutrality. The coe±cients P T i=1 ® i capture¯rm-speci¯c e®ects. The estimations take the form:
The results are essentially similar to those in the subset regressions of Panel A. The estimated coe±cient¯3, captures the impact of repurchasing on the order imbalance-return relationship. In the¯rm¯xed-e®ect regression, the coe±cients (¯3) on R ¤ N T O (now interacted with overall market indicators) are negative as before. Thus our modi¯ed BHK approach provides additional evidence that corporate repurchase trades contribute to, rather than diminish, liquidity, at least relative to other potential purchasers.
Market Timing Ability
We have demonstrated that¯rms do have an impact on market liquidity through their repurchasing presence. We have also demonstrated that they can provide price support and stem the tide of a falling price. The¯nal issue we consider is whether at an aggregate level, they are able to time the market from a cost minimization perspective. That is, aggregating across the entire repurchase program, do they beat naive accumulation strategies? Since motives and objectives regarding the announcement and execution of a repurchase program may vary substantially across¯rms, we base our analysis on the assumption that, ceteris paribus, repurchasing¯rms prefer low acquisition costs on the repurchase portfolio.
We begin by evaluating the¯rms' timing decisions on the chosen trading days. That is, was their purchase price above or below the price of other trades on the same day? We compare the share-weighted average repurchase price for each day with the share-weighted average price of all nonrepurchase volume for the day.
27 Table 8 provides details. On the NYSE,¯rms pay an average of 2 cents less per share than non-corporate trades. The di®erence is signi¯cant at conventional levels. On the Nasdaq, corporations pay nearly 10 cents more per share than non-corporate trades. The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant and economically meaningful representing nearly 1% of the purchase price. Additionally, as reported in Table 5 , over 40% of NYSE repurchases are executed below the quote midpoint, whereas only 16% are similarly executed for the Nasdaq. Thus, taking the choice of trade day as given, NYSE¯rms appear to have good execution skills, whereas Nasdaq¯rms pay signi¯cantly higher relative prices.
We next evaluate each¯rm's skill in selecting days to trade over the course of a repurchase program. The measurement of timing in a repurchase framework is not the same as that of a typical portfolio manager. Traditional measures such as those discussed in Grinblatt and Titman (1993) , exploit the ability of traders to buy and sell securities. Since U.S. corporations only have discretion over when they buy shares, they face an optimal accumulation problem rather than a traditional market timing problem. Thus, we evaluate actual accumulation strategies against other accumulation strategies that achieve the same ultimate share holdings (and have the same terminal wealth).
The benchmarks we consider relate to the cost of acquiring the same number of shares as actually repurchased through di®erent repurchase patterns. We begin with the actual dollar cost of a program:
where AC i is the dollar cost for¯rm i, RD i is the set of days¯rm i was successful in repurchasing, P it is the average price paid by¯rm i on day t, and V R it is the volume (number of shares) repurchased by¯rm i on day t. The 64 repurchase programs cost an average of $45.7 million, with a range of $147,875 to $500,000,000. We compare each program's performance against several, although certainly not all, reasonable benchmarks.
The minimum (maximum) cost strategy assumes that shares were repurchased at the lowest (highest) feasible aggregate price during the repurchase period.
29 Table 9 contains details. The average NYSE program costs $116.3 million with a median of $62.8 million. The
NYSE¯rms pay on average $12.3 million above the minimum cost, but about $15 million less than the maximum cost. In percent terms, the median di®erence from the cost benchmarks is +6.5% and -10.8%. The statistical tests for dollar and percent di®erences (where each¯rm provides one observation) indicate that NYSE repurchasing¯rms do signi¯cantly better than the maximum cost benchmark and worse than the minimum cost. The Nasdaq programs in our sample, averaging only $6.1 million, are signi¯cantly smaller than those for the NYSE.
Our Nasdaq¯rms pay on average $570,652 more than minimum cost, but $475,490 less than 28 The portfolio costs we evaluate do not include commissions. 29 These measures represent theoretical upper and lower bound costs to acquire the reported repurchased shares during each repurchase program. We do not claim that¯rms could execute our benchmark strategies. For example, SEC 10b-18 provisions restrict¯rms conforming to 10b-18 from repurchasing during the last half-hour of the trading session. maximum cost. The overall worst execution¯rm pays nearly $85 million more than the minimum cost (in a total program value of $500 million); the best execution is equal to the minimum cost.
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A more realistic benchmark might be the cost of buying the same number of shares by accumulating them uniformly over the entire reported repurchase period.
31 For each day, starting with the¯rst reported repurchase through the last reported repurchase, our \uniform" strategy buys a¯xed number of shares every day at the closing price. The uniform repurchase cost (U C) is de¯ned as:
where T i is the number of trading days in the repurchase horizon for¯rm i, V
it is the number of shares in the terminal repurchase portfolio, and P c it is the closing price on day t for¯rm i.
A second naive benchmark buys in proportion to each day's trading volume. The proportional repurchase cost (P C) for¯rm i is de¯ned as:
where V i = P t V it is the total volume over the repurchase horizon and V it is the total shares traded on day t in stock i. The third naive strategy we consider is repurchasing`as soon as possible' (ASAP) subject to trading volume for the day. We assume the corporation repurchases 100% of the trading volume beginning the¯rst day of an actual repurchase and continues taking 100% of each consecutive day's volume until all desired shares are repurchased. The¯nal benchmark we consider examines the cost of buying the program at the closing price for each actual repurchase day. Thus, this measure examines, from a program-wide perspective, the within-day timing of trades. The closing repurchase cost 30 One¯rm repurchased on only one day and traded at the lowest price for the day. 31 We begin the accumulation on the day of the¯rst actual repurchase which assures that some funds were available to consummate repurchases. Prior to this date an announcement of a program does not assure that the capital has been made available to those responsible for repurchase execution.
(CC) for¯rm i is de¯ned as:
where CC i is the dollar closing cost for¯rm i, RD i is the set of days¯rm i was successful in repurchasing, P c it is the closing price for¯rm i on day t, and V R it is the volume (number of shares) repurchased by¯rm i on day t. Table 9 provides details for these additional cost-based benchmarks. Apparent di®erences between NYSE and Nasdaq timing skill emerge. We¯nd that the 41 Nasdaq programs pay more than if they had repurchased as soon as possible. That is, their decision to wait to repurchase was on average $319,048 more expensive than if they had been able to repurchase all shares as quickly as possible. The average percent di®erence from the ASAP benchmark is 1.3% with 63% of Nasdaq¯rms' having higher than ASAP benchmark costs. Nasdaq costs were not signi¯cantly di®erent from the uniform or proportional benchmarks. Relative to the closing cost benchmark, the Nasdaq¯rms paid signi¯cantly more in both dollars and percentage terms. Overall, 30 of the 41 Nasdaq¯rms underperformed this simplistic benchmark.
The 23 NYSE¯rms, in contrast, appear to exhibit some timing skill. Their acquisition costs are lower than the uniform and proportional benchmarks, saving an average of $1.4 million per program. Only 17.4% of the NYSE¯rms paid more than the uniform benchmark cost and 21.7% paid more than the proportional benchmark cost. While NYSE¯rms' acquisition costs were not signi¯cantly less than the ASAP costs, 14 of 23¯rms (60.8%) did pay less than purchasing as soon as possible.
The reported means and medians mask the fact that some Nasdaq¯rms have good costbased performance and a few NYSE¯rms have poor cost-based performance. Examination of the proportional benchmark reveals that 5 of 23 NYSE programs (21.7%) had timing decisions worse than a proportional approach, and 12 of 41 Nasdaq¯rms, or 34.1%, actually beat a proportional strategy. The non-uniformity of results within exchange-listing is consistent with the diversity of styles we highlighted in Section 3. Perhaps most provocative is the suggestion that NYSE¯rms' accumulation strategies appear on average to outperform those of Nasdaq¯rms. We¯nd that the NYSE¯rms outperformed the Nasdaq¯rms for 4 out of 6 accumulation strategies. We only¯nd no di®erence in performance relative to the minimum cost and the as soon as possible accumulation strategies.
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Concluding Remarks
It is di±cult to characterize a`typical' open market repurchase program. Firms exhibit a diversity of styles in timing repurchase trades. Notwithstanding the inherent variety in repurchase programs, we¯nd that the daily decision to repurchase is sensitive to local price and volume conditions, and, for NYSE¯rms, may involve timing or execution expertise relative to naive benchmarks. Regarding evidence whether corporations adapt their repurchases to inside information, our results indicate that, on average,¯rms appear to take some care to avoid the appearance of opportunistic trading by refraining from repurchasing around announcement dates. Additionally, we¯nd the widespread use of limit orders for executing repurchases. The use of limit orders is consistent with both the desire to provide liquidity by absorbing sell-side pressure and the desire to support a falling stock price.
Counter to the results of Brockman and Chung (2001) for Hong Kong equities traded in a closely regulated environment, we¯nd that U.S. repurchase trading contributes to market liquidity. Our evidence indicates that repurchase activity coincides with narrower bid-ask spreads relative to three di®erent benchmark periods: (i) prior to the repurchase announcement; (ii) on non-repurchase days immediately before days with repurchase transactions; and (iii) on non-repurchase days immediately after days with repurchase transactions. We argue that the documented spread narrowing is consistent with the notion that, at the time of a repurchase transaction, the corporation on average competes with market makers to provide 32 Risk and time adjusted excess wealth creation measures provide no additional insight. We have calculated expected excess wealth based on (1) the ex ante risk-free rate and (2) a CAPM-based rate of return, and¯nd no evidence of signi¯cant abnormal wealth creation due to repurchase execution. However, consistent with the cost-based analysis, NYSE¯rms do beat the naive uniform, proportional and closing cost repurchase strategies even after controlling for risk.
liquidity on the bid side of the market. Overall, we¯nd convincing evidence that repurchase trading confers at least local liquidity advantages to those trading the corporation's equity.
Open market repurchase programs are an increasingly important aspect of a company's payout policy and its treasury function. Due to the veil behind which repurchase trading takes place, we know very little about how open market repurchase programs are executed.
Although current U.S. disclosure policy inhibits a more universal investigation of the costs and bene¯ts of U.S. repurchase trading, our study of voluntarily disclosed data suggests that open market repurchases provide a potentially important liquidity bene¯t, the scope and magnitude of which appear to interact with the underlying market structure. As might be anticipated, the combinatorial search frequently generates more than one matching combination at a given level of complexity (e.g., 15 pairs). In these instances, we search for common trades occuring in all combinations at the given level of complexity. For example, if we are searching for 10,100 shares at $30.00, and¯nd 15 feasible pairs, each containing the same 10,000 share at $30.00 print but matched with 15 di®erent 100 share at $30.00 prints, we classify the 10,000 share print as an identi¯ed repurchase in a partially identi¯ed pair. The 100 share portion remains`unidenti¯ed.' We can identify an additional 674 prints using this within-complexity procedure. Overall, of the 3,585 reported repurchases across 2,190¯rm days, we can identify 2,655 prints on 1,431¯rm days representing over 31 million shares.
We recognize that our heuristic is not perfect and o®er three defenses:
1. The measures of execution timing and skill that consider aggregate daily reported repurchase price and volume are not subject to error from transaction misidenti¯cation.
2. Misidenti¯cation will tend to diminish di®erences and bias against signi¯cance in our transactions-level tests.
3. We ran exhaustive combinations on the subset of reported repurchases where (i) there were not more than 30 prints in the TAQ data for the day; or (ii) there were not more than 100 TAQ prints and not more than 3,000 shares repurchased for the day.
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This exhaustive searching identi¯es 504 trades. These must be repurchases if the¯rms provided accurate disclosure. All transaction-speci¯c tests are replicated on this smaller exhaustive subset; while the power of the tests decline, all results are qualitatively the same.
35 The 3,000 share requirement limits the search to combinations of not more than 30, as prints are reported on TAQ in round lots of 100 shares. The choice of a maximum complexity level of 30 for the exhaustive search is dictated by computing constraints. 
Figure 3
Identified repurchase shares and non-corporate trading volume (which includes unidentified repurchase shares) are presented for Nasdaq and NYSE firms separately. We partition each day into 13 half-hour windows and present half-hourly trading volume as a percent of total trading volume for the day. 
Figure 4
The actual repurchase cost for each of the 64 programs in our study are presented as a percent of five different cost-based benchmarks; uniform, proportional, as soon as possible, minimum and maximum cost. We compute statistics on daily average spread data for all repurchase days and on the spread differences relative to select non-repurchase days. Differences are defined as the repurchase spread minus the appropriate benchmark spread. The non-repurchase days we choose are a pre-repurchase period (the average of four weeks prior to the week of the first repurchase), the lag day defined as the day preceding a repurchase if no repurchase occurred on the lag day, and the lead day defined as the day following a repurchase if no repurchase occurred on the lead day. For example, if a firm repurchases on 3 consecutive days, the first day will have a lag benchmark and the third day will have a lead benchmark, however the middle trade day will have neither a lead or lag comparison. p -values from Student t and Wilcoxon signed rank statistics are shown in parentheses and brackets, respectively, against the null hypothesis that the mean and median spread difference between the repurchase day and non-repurchase day is equal to zero.
Intercept NTO (β1) R * NTO (β2) Table 7B : Price Impact Liquidity Effects Each day is partitioned into 13 one-half hour trading windows. The dependent variable in the estimation is the return in each time window measured as the change in the mid-point of the bid-ask spread from the beginning of the period to the end of the period. We estimate two fixed effect regressions. The first isolates repurchase impact under periods of sell pressure. The second regression isolates repurchase impact under periods of buy pressure. The independent variables are the net turnover (NTO) measured as the buy volume during the period less the sell volume during the period, scaled by shares outstanding, and three indicator variables. We code (Neg = 1) for periods of negative NTO and zero otherwise. We code (Pos = 1) for periods of positive NTO and zero otherwise. We also include an indicator set to one (R = 1) for days of successful repurchase. Actual repurchase cost is compared to several repurchase strategies over the repurchase horizon. Mean and median relative costs are provided. P-values from paired t-tests against the null hypothesis of no difference in price paid (dollar and percent) by the corporation relative to the six naive accumulation strategies are provided. We present values for the entire sample and partitioned by exchange listing. We also present parametric t-tests and non-parametric Kruskal Wallis tests against the null hypothesis of equality across the NYSE and Nasdaq results.
NYSE Estimations
